Training in the Great Recession - evidence from an individual perspective by Dietz, Daniel & Zwick, Thomas
Dis cus si on Paper No. 18-037
Training in the Great Recession –  
Evidence from an Individual Perspective 
Daniel Dietz and Thomas Zwick
Dis cus si on Paper No. 18-037
Training in the Great Recession –  
Evidence from an Individual Perspective 
Daniel Dietz and Thomas Zwick
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp18037.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
1 
 
TRAINING IN THE GREAT RECESSION -  
EVIDENCE FROM AN INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVE
1
 
 
Daniel Dietz (University of Wuerzburg) and Thomas Zwick (University of Wuerzburg and 
ZEW, Mannheim) 
 
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the effect of the economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 on individual training 
activities of different employee groups within establishments. We use a unique German linked 
employer–employee panel data set with detailed information on individual training history 
(WeLL-ADIAB). The so-called Great Recession can be seen as an exogenous, unexpected, 
and time-limited shock. Therefore, our quasi-experimental setting using Diff-in-Diff analyses 
reveals the causal impact of the crisis on the training participation and the number of training 
measures. We find a direct negative effect of the crisis on individual training activities in 
2009 and 2010. The negative effect therefore sets in with a time lag and lasts until after the 
recession. Furthermore, the recession effect is stronger for employees in unskilled jobs than 
for employees in skilled jobs.  
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1
 We use the anonymized ‘Berufliche Weiterbildung als Bestandteil lebenslangen Lernens’ (‘Further Training as 
a Part of Lifelong Learning’, WeLL) data set provided by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal 
Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). Data access was via guest research spells 
at FDZ and afterwards via controlled remote data access at FDZ (project number 603). We thank Alexandra 
Schmucker and Stefan Bender for advice with data preparation and interpretation and Boris Hirsch, Susanne 
Steffes as well as Arne Warnke for useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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Introduction 
Further training in Germany is market driven and investment decisions are mainly 
taken and funded by the establishments (Bender et al., 2008a). Training firms expect 
productivity gains at the individual and establishment levels (Zwick, 2005) and aim to recoup 
their training investments by obtaining a difference between productivity and wages after 
training (Dearden et al., 2000). Training therefore might increase the competitiveness of 
employers. However, in economically difficult and uncertain times, credit constraints and 
demand reductions might induce employers to reduce training. Training investments might be 
reduced because of uncertain future employment needs and the lower expected tenure of 
trained employees. Training might also decrease when employers shift investments to more 
pressing areas because training investments are often expensive, their true benefits are rather 
hard to assess, and they may come with a lag. Firms however also might use slack periods 
during recessions in order to increase the share of training in total investments because their 
opportunity costs are temporarily low. In addition, the outside options for trained employees 
decrease in uncertain times and therefore the costs necessary to retain trained employees 
might be lower. Both arguments lead to different predictions of the consequences of 
recessions for training investments and competitiveness. Hence, it is important to empirically 
investigate how establishments’ training activities are affected by a recession. As 
establishments’ training provision often depends on the skill level of the employees (Barron et 
al., 1999; Blundell et al., 1999), the question also arises whether establishments’ reactions in 
training activities are specific to certain employee groups. If less skilled employee groups are 
hit harder by recessions, this might be a reason for the frequently observed increase in 
inequality after recessions (Forster et al., 2011; Grabka, 2015; OECD, 2015). 
This paper focuses on the consequences of the so-called Great Recession in the years 
2008 and 2009 on training efforts of firms in Germany. This crisis was triggered primarily by 
the collapse of the US real estate market. In particular, the bankruptcy of the bank Lehman 
Brothers in late 2008 and the subsequent collapse of the interbank lending market led to a 
decline in demand, resulting from banks’ restricted resources for lending and credit 
constraints (Bond et al., 2005; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). In contrast to other countries, 
the labour market in Germany was only partially affected with mainly the export-oriented 
manufacturing industry being hit by demand reductions and credit constraints (Bellmann and 
Buttler, 2010; Möller, 2010; Hochfellner et al., 2015). Other economic sectors were hardly 
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affected, however. The crisis was short, pervasive, and it came as a surprise for most 
politicians, managers, and employees (Bloom, 2014). We therefore do not have to take 
anticipation effects into account. These characteristics imply that we can use the Great 
Recession as quasi-natural experiment in which the training reactions of a treatment group of 
firms that was affected by an exogenous demand and credit shock can be compared to training 
activities of firms that were not affected. We use a Diff-in-Diff analysis and can therefore 
avoid the usual problem that unobservable third factors such as management quality or the 
importance of human capital for competitiveness drive both, the impact of the business cycle 
and firm training decisions (Hochfellner et al., 2015; Popov, 2014).  
In contrast to previous research on the impact of the business cycle on training, this is 
the first paper to use primarily training information collected from individual employees. 
Thus, we can take into account that the establishments’ training provision often depends on 
the skill level of the employees. Higher ability lowers the costs of training, which results in 
increasing rates of returns to training with qualification. Furthermore, higher education and 
skill levels help employees to adapt more rapidly to new tasks. Nevertheless, firms might also 
offer up-skilling to low skilled employees during a recession in order to be able to retain these 
employees for the next boom phase (Brunello, 2009). Based on the extensive German linked 
employer–employee panel data set WeLL-ADIAB, we can relate individual training 
information to the establishments in which the training measures took place (Bender et al., 
2008a; Spengler, 2007). Our data set also includes employees without training investments. 
Furthermore, from the administrative establishment-level data based on the IAB 
Establishment Panel, information regarding the respective training establishments is available. 
In addition to general information about the establishment, it also includes very detailed 
information on the degree to which establishments were hit by the economic crisis (Fischer et 
al., 2008). We can observe training behaviour of the firms before, during and after the crisis 
because we have data from 2006-2010.  
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework and 
derives the hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents the data set and the identification strategy. Chapter 
4 outlines the estimation strategy. The results of descriptive and multivariate analyses as well 
as the robustness checks are shown and discussed in Chapter 5. The paper ends with a 
conclusion in Chapter 6. 
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Theoretical framework 
Background discussion 
From a theoretical perspective, there is ambiguity as to whether an economic crisis 
leads to higher or lower training activities. In economically tough times, declines in demand 
often leave capacities underutilized. As the loss of working time is cheaper with idle 
capacities, opportunity costs of further training are lower (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998; 
Brunello, 2009). During the crisis, the outside options for trained employees are also 
relatively bad and therefore the risk of poaching for these employees declines. The lower exit 
risk of trained workers additionally reduces the opportunity costs of training (Felstead and 
Green, 1996; Mason and Bishop, 2015). As a consequence, establishments might have higher 
incentives to exempt employees from everyday work to participate in training measures. 
Furthermore, the possibility of participating in training even in rough times may contribute to 
employees’ motivation and commitment (Bellmann et al., 2014). Another argument for higher 
training activities in a recession is that qualified employees will be more productive in the 
following upswing (Brunello, 2009). Keeping people in the establishment instead of 
dismissing them also saves adjustment costs such as dismissal costs and costs of new hiring 
and initial training (Horning, 1994; Knudsen and Lien, 2015; Mason and Bishop, 2015). The 
strategy of labour hoarding in combination with training activities is particularly important in 
view of the expected shortage of skilled workers and the necessity of retaining qualified 
employees in a boom phase (Möller, 2010).  
However, economic theory also suggests that establishments may reduce training 
activities in times of crisis. Owing to declining sales and possible credit constraints, 
establishments must limit their investments in all areas (Mason and Bishop, 2015). Training 
costs are often very high, and their effects and benefits are generally rather hard to assess and 
may come with a lag (Becker, 1962). Therefore, establishments will tend to invest their 
limited resources in areas where short-term returns can be generated (Bellmann et al., 2014; 
Popov, 2014). Especially when the duration of the crisis and establishments’ future prospects 
are difficult to predict, it is uncertain whether a return on training can be achieved at all. 
Training measures only become cost-effective for establishments when the marginal 
productivity of the trained employees is higher than their wages (Barron et al., 1997a). 
However, when capacity utilization is not expected to return to pre-recession levels, there may 
also be lower expectations regarding the impact of training on productivity (Mason and 
Bishop, 2015; Shury, 2010). In the case of limited commercial activities, the capabilities of 
trained employees cannot be fully utilized. In addition, there is lower demand for initial 
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training because fewer employees are hired (Brunello, 2009). In consequence, establishments 
may consider further training as unprofitable and reduce their investments (Stevens, 1994).  
Cost–benefit considerations of training often suggest skill levels as key drivers for the 
provision of training. Higher abilities of the qualified employees reduce the training costs 
(Blundell et al., 1999; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Better learning results are mainly caused 
by the well-established cumulative effect of knowledge acquisition. Accordingly, employees 
with higher levels of knowledge learn more easily (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Hatch and Dyer, 
2004). Also, Card (1999) and Heckman (1999) emphasize that higher skilled employees have 
higher learning abilities in further training. Higher learning abilities in turn lead to higher 
rates of return for trained employees with higher skills
2
 (Arulampalam and Booth, 2001; 
Barron et al., 1989). In consequence, it is more profitable for an establishment to train well-
qualified employees (Bassanini and Ok, 2007; Kuckulenz and Zwick, 2004). Furthermore, 
skilled employees are able to adapt more rapidly and efficiently to new tasks and they are 
often the main source of innovation (Blundell et al., 1999). Thus, skilled employees help to 
better overcome an economic crisis that is associated with uncertainty and a higher need to 
adapt. Higher skilled employees are therefore more likely to be hoarded and trained during a 
recession (Hochfellner et al., 2015; Knudsen and Lien, 2015). In the decision to provide 
training in the crisis, establishments may also include the fact that less well-qualified 
employees are often less willing to participate in training (Borghans et al., 2008; Fouarge et 
al., 2013). This problem is caused by the fact that most low qualified employees already had 
negative learning experiences in school and accordingly want to avoid training in later life 
(Illeris, 2006). If less skilled employees are hit harder by a recession this might be one reason 
for the observation that earnings inequality frequently increases after recessions (Forster et al., 
2011; Grabka, 2015; OECD, 2015). 
 
Previous empirical evidence 
The few studies on the impact of a recession on further training lead to contradicting 
results. Based on data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 
Majumdar (2007) reveals pro-cyclical training activities for the period from 1979 to 1988. He 
shows that the probability of receiving training decreases with the local unemployment rate. 
                                                          
2
 Positive selection into training must be considered. It is difficult to know whether the higher earnings of better 
qualified employees are caused by their higher education, or whether these employees choose to acquire more 
training. According to this, the return on training will sometimes be overestimated (Blundell et al., 1999; Card, 
1999; Heckman, 1999).  
6 
 
This relationship is explained by better recruitment possibilities in the labour market and 
therefore reduced incentives for establishments to provide training. Sepulveda (2004) also 
uses the NLSY data from 1979 to 1998 but finds counter-cyclical training participation. The 
training incidence and intensity of on-the-job training and off-the-job training decrease with 
GDP. Using data from 15 European countries, Bassanini and Brunello (2008) also suggest a 
negative relationship between the proportion of employees participating in training and the 
economic situation. Bassanini et al. (2007) find higher training activities of establishments 
with unemployment rates in different European countries.  
There are only a few studies analysing the effects of the Great Recession in 2008 and 
2009 on the establishments’ training activities. Based on different data sets and qualitative 
interviews from the UK, Felstead et al. (2012) find that the crisis had not a dramatic negative 
impact on training provision. Only a minority of establishments reduced spending per head. In 
many cases, establishments searched for more cost-effective ways of training and adapted 
these measures to their business needs (Felstead et al., 2012). In contrast, Popov (2014) 
stresses that limited access to financial resources and bank credit is associated with 
significantly lower training investments. Analysing survey data on small and medium-sized 
establishments from 25 transition economies, he also reveals stronger negative effects in 
education-intensive sectors and in sectors with good global growth potential (Popov, 2014). 
Based on the IAB Establishment Panel, Bellmann et al. (2014) find that German 
establishments reduced their training activities in 2009 – at the peak of the crisis – compared 
with 2008, independently of whether or not they have been directly affected by the economic 
crisis. In addition, establishments that have been directly affected by the crisis reduced their 
training efforts to a much larger extent than other establishments. The studies on the current 
economic crisis suggest a negative impact on training activities. However, they do not permit 
separate observations of training participation for different employee groups. Only Mason and 
Bishop (2015) differentiate the impact of the recession on training for employee groups. 
Based on longitudinal data from Employer Skills Updating Surveys in the UK, they find that 
the downturn has contributed to reductions in training especially for off-the-job training and 
for skilled and highly skilled employees. On-the-job training was reduced slightly and 
stronger targeted at employees with identified skill improvement needs. The employers were 
however just asked about training needs and not about the actual training participation of their 
employees. Therefore, employers may have an interest in reporting training statistics to their 
advantage. 
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Hochfellner et al. (2015) provide the only analysis that examines the impact of the 
recent crisis on individual-level outcomes such as earnings, unemployment probability and 
mobility. Based on a linked employer–employee data set for Germany, they show that 
unskilled, less educated and less experienced employees are most negatively affected by 
financial shocks in the downturn. In contrast, employees in the higher skill categories are able 
to mitigate these shocks. As a result, the crisis increases the existing income differentials 
between the employee groups. However, this study does not consider training information.  
 
Hypotheses 
From the theoretical perspective, it is not clear whether difficult economic times lead 
to higher or lower establishment training activities. There is empirical evidence for training 
being counter-cyclical (Sepulveda, 2004) or pro-cyclical (Bassanini et al., 2007; Bassanini 
and Brunello, 2008; Majumdar, 2007). However, all studies that have analysed the effects of 
the Great Recession find negative effects on establishments’ training activities (Bellmann et 
al., 2014; Felstead et al., 2012; Mason and Bishop, 2015; Popov, 2014). The recession in 
addition came as a shock and incurred strong uncertainty on the future development (Bloom, 
2014). Our assumptions therefore are:   
 
H1: When establishments are negatively affected by the Great Recession, the training 
participation of their employees decreases. 
H2: When establishments are negatively affected by the Great Recession, the number 
of training measures offered decreases. 
 
In the context of training decisions, for establishments, cost–benefit considerations are 
decisive. Training only becomes effective when employees’ post-training benefits are greater 
than their costs and establishments achieve positive rates of return (Barron et al., 1997a; 
Becker, 1962). Owing to the limited financial resources, returns of training are essential in 
times of crisis. Training theory suggests higher returns of training and higher expected values 
for skilled training participants (Arulampalam and Booth, Barron et al., 1989, 1999; Card, 
1999). Furthermore, because they can better adapt to changes in the environment, skilled 
employees help to better overcome the crisis and the uncertainty it incurs (Blundell et al., 
1999). According to Hochfellner et al. (2015), less skilled employees are more negatively 
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affected by the Great Recession and face a stronger decline in salary and job losses. We 
therefore assume: 
 
H3: When establishments are negatively affected by the recession, the training 
participation of unskilled employees decreases stronger than training participation of 
skilled employees.  
H4: When establishments are negatively affected by the recession, they stronger 
reduce the number of training measures for unskilled employees than for skilled 
employees. 
 
Data and identification strategy 
We use the German linked employer–employee panel data set WeLL-ADIAB. The 
data set is based on a survey of 149 establishments that were selected from the 2005 wave of 
the IAB Establishment Panel
3
. From these establishments, 7,352 randomly selected 
employees were asked in four annual waves
4
 about their individual training behaviour 
between 2007 and 2010. Training information includes the start and end dates, the duration as 
well as the thematic focus of the measures. An advantage of the data set is the linkage of the 
individual training information with administrative data at individual and establishment level 
(Bender et al., 2008a; Spengler, 2007; Dietz and Zwick, 2016). Thus, in addition to socio-
demographic information (age, sex, occupational status), the complete individual employment 
history
5
 for training participants and non-participants is available (Schmucker et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, based on the linkage of individual information with establishment-level data 
from the IAB Establishment Panel, it is also possible to assign the training information to the 
establishment where the training took place. In addition to information about the 
establishment that might be related to training provision (size, sector, location), we also have 
                                                          
3
 In the selection process, only establishments from manufacturing or the service industry located in the German 
federal states of Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
and Saxony and establishments with between 50 and 1,999 employees were considered (Bender et al., 2008b and 
Knerr et al., 2012). As the selection of establishments did not occur randomly, the data set cannot claim to be 
representative of the population of German establishments.  
4
 The first wave contains the complete training information for the years 2006 and 2007, the second wave the 
training information for the year 2008, the third wave for 2009 and the fourth wave for 2010.  
5
 The employment history includes start and end dates of employment periods, the exact daily wage in the 
respective periods, further characteristics of employment (e.g. occupation, job status, working time) and 
unemployment spells. This information has been collected for social insurance reasons by administrative 
institutions and is therefore highly reliable (Bender et al., 2009; Schmucker et al., 2014). 
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detailed information on the degree to which the establishment was hit by the economic crisis 
(Fischer et al., 2008).  
The training information and all individual data therefore come from the employees 
and the crisis information originates from the establishments. This combination has the 
advantage that employees can provide much more detailed and reliable information on their 
educational and employment biographies as well as on certain training measures than their 
employers. Although the training measures are offered by establishments, it is often unclear 
for the management to what extent employees participate in them. In addition, separating the 
source of training data from the source of crisis information also helps us to avoid common 
method bias. Another problem the literature on the impact of recessions on training provision 
faces is that it is often hard to observe when and how establishments are affected by a 
recession and how the causality runs between business cycle and training. More specifically, 
it is usually hard to exclude unobservable third factors such as higher manager quality or 
better growth opportunities that influence both, the risk of the firm to be hit by a recession and 
its training behaviour (Popov, 2014). Endogeneity therefore might bias the estimated 
relationship between a recession and training efforts. In order to avoid this problem, a crisis 
must be exogenous in the sense that it affects firms independently of their training strategy 
and other factors related to training behaviour.  
A recession often is the result of unanticipated changes in the environment, such as 
bursting bubbles in the property or stock market or dramatic changes in commodity prices. 
Thus, the beginning of such a crisis can be seen as an exogenous shock for establishments and 
the entire economy (Knudsen and Lien, 2015). In addition, a recession is temporary
6
, and 
establishments know that it will be over sooner or later (Koberg, 1987). The economic crisis 
in 2008 and 2009 in addition was unpredictable. Therefore, the Great Recession can be seen 
as an exogenous shock and anticipation effects of firms can be mainly excluded.  
Previous empirical studies investigating the impact of the current financial crisis use 
different identification strategies. Felstead et al. (2012) as well as Mason and Bishop (2015) 
identify the crisis by means of time. They assume that 2008 is a pre-crisis period, 2009 during 
the crisis and 2010 after the crisis. However, both studies do not differentiate between 
affected and unaffected establishments. Furthermore, they are not able to rule out that training 
efforts as well as the involvement in the crisis may be influenced by unobservable third 
                                                          
6
 This distinguishes a recession from a technological shock that leads to permanent changes in the economy 
(Knudsen and Lien, 2015). 
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factors (Popov, 2014). In order to avoid this endogeneity problem, Popov (2014) and 
Hochfellner et al. (2015) apply Diff-in-Diff approaches. In addition, Hochfellner et al. (2015) 
exploit an institutional feature of the German banking system to identify a control group that 
serves as a plausible counter-factual on the basis of German states. Despite their convenient 
empirical setting, it is unclear whether all establishments in the states with a Landesbank 
suffering from credit constraints are affected by the crisis. To identify affected establishments, 
Bellmann et al. (2014) therefore use information from the 2010 wave of the IAB 
Establishment Panel. Based on self-assessments, establishments were asked whether and to 
what extent they were affected by the Great Recession.  
We also apply Bellmann et al.’s (2014) identification strategy. Based on the questions 
‘have you been affected by the economic crisis in the last two years?’ and ‘were the effects on 
your establishment predominantly negative?’, we calculate a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the establishments agree to both questions; otherwise, the crisis dummy is 0. In the 
2010 wave of the Establishment Panel, there are 78 establishments with information about the 
crisis. Of these, 40 establishments
7
 claimed that they had been negatively affected by the 
crisis and these are henceforth referred to as crisis establishments. Another 30 companies 
stated that they were not affected by the crisis and they are referred to as non-crisis 
establishments
8
.  
In addition, we test and compare the classification of crisis and non-crisis 
establishments with other crisis indicators. Applying the identification strategy of Hochfellner 
et al. (2015), most of the establishments in the states in which the regional Landesbanks were 
affected by the crisis also claimed to be crisis establishments in our data set. Furthermore, we 
compare the business expectations of crisis and non-crisis establishments over time. Although 
there are no differences in expected business volume in 2006, 2007 and 2010, the business 
expectations of crisis establishments were more negative in 2008 and 2009 that those of non-
crisis establishments. Crisis establishments have fewer employees and they are found 
especially in manufacturing industry, compare Bellmann et al. (2014) and Hochfellner et al. 
(2015).
9
  
                                                          
7
 The crisis/non-crisis classification of the establishments is fixed and does not change over time. However, 11 of 
our 40 crisis companies reported that they had overcome the crisis in 2010. Therefore, these establishments 
switch from crisis to non-crisis establishments in the year 2010. The other establishments keep their status. 
8
 The remaining eight establishments were eliminated from the sample because they indicated that they had been 
affected both positively and negatively by the crisis.   
9
 Due to the data protection agreement with the IAB no descriptive results can be presented at the operational 
level for both crisis and non-crisis establishments. 
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From the 40 crisis and 30 non-crisis establishments, we have detailed information of 
2,398 employees. Only employees with jobs covered by social security contributions
10
 are 
included in the sample. Furthermore, in order to obtain a homogeneous sample, we eliminated 
442 employees who worked short-time
11
. Thus, the sample consists of 5,983 observations 
from 1,956 individuals. As employment spells and training spells are measured on a daily and 
monthly basis, respectively, we know whether training measures for skilled and unskilled 
employees have taken place in an establishment that was affected by the crisis or not. 
 
Estimation strategy 
The main goal of this paper is the identification of the causal effect of the crisis on 
establishments’ individual training activities. The training activities of individuals must be 
compared not only between crisis establishments and non-crisis establishments, but also 
before, during and after the crisis. An experimental design such as the Difference-in-
Differences specification (Diff-in-Diff) achieves such a comparison. The changes in training 
effort in the control group are subtracted from the changes in the treatment group. In this way, 
distortions between control and treatment group resulting from fundamental differences in 
both groups as well as distortions resulting from temporal trends can be removed (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009). As already described in the identification strategy, the 
Great Recession can be seen as an exogenous, unanticipated and random shock for 
establishments and the training activities of their employees. By using the Diff-in-Diff 
approach, it is therefore possible to control for endogeneity and time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity between crisis and non-crisis establishments. Using i to index an individual, j an 
establishment and t the time, we specify the following estimation model: 
 
 𝑦   = 𝛽 + 𝐶  ∗ 𝑇′ 𝛽 + 𝐶  𝛽 + 𝑇
 
 𝛽 + 𝛸
 
   𝛽 +𝑍
 
   𝛽 + 𝜀    
 
Focusing on the individual perspective, the dependent binary variable 𝑦    takes the 
value of 1 if an employee i participates in training offered by the training establishment j in 
the respective year t. Otherwise, the variable takes the value 0. In addition, we take the 
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 Apprentices, people in internships and employees in partial retirement have been excluded from the sample. 
11
 Many contributions pointed to a strong increase of short-time work during the recessions and the strong 
incentives of employers to provide training for employees working short-time (Brenke et al., 2013). In order to 
avoid biased results from this additional channel between recession and training, we exclude short-time work in 
the main analysis and run a robustness check later. 
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number of individual training measures
12
 per year into account. For the research question, it is 
important to know when and in which establishment the training measure took place. 
Therefore, we eliminate all training measures that have no detailed information concerning 
their start and end dates and that could not be clearly assigned to an establishment (126 
eliminations). In addition, we only consider training measures that are financed (at least 
partially) by the establishment.
 
 
The binary variable 𝐶   indicates whether an establishment was hit by the economic 
crisis (𝐶  = 1) or not. The binary variable 𝑇′  reflects the cyclical differences in training 
activities over time with a vector of time dummies for the years 2006 to 2010. The 
interactions of the two variables 𝐶  ∗ 𝑇′  can be interpreted as the differences in the 
development of individual training activities over time between employees in crisis and non-
crisis establishments. We have four Diff-in-Diff dummies: the interactions of the years 2007 
to 2010 with 𝐶  . Given the unexpected exogenous shock of the crisis, prior to the occurrence 
of this shock, the development of training effort should be the same for crisis and non-crisis 
establishments. In order to verify this identification assumption, a placebo test should indicate 
no significant interaction effect for the pre-crisis period (Bellmann et al., 2014).  
In addition to the crisis information, further individual- and establishment-level 
characteristics are considered that may influence training participation and the likelihood of 
being affected by the crisis simultaneously. Empirical evidence suggests lower training 
participation especially for women and older employees with higher tenure and work 
experience (Blundell et al., 1996; Picchio and Van Ours, 2013). In contrast, higher qualified 
employees have a higher probability of participating in training (Arulampalam and Booth, 
2001; Card, 1999; Gritz, 1993). In addition, it is known that employees with higher work 
experience are less affected by the crisis (Hochfellner et al., 2015). Therefore, the individual 
characteristics vector 𝛸     includes the variables gender, age, occupational status
13, tenure, 
and work experience14. Studies focusing on establishment-level determinants of training find 
that especially employees in larger establishments have a higher probability of receiving 
training. Furthermore, the sector and the location of the establishment have an impact on the 
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 In order to ensure consistency, we limit the maximum number of training measures per year to 12 and delete 
four observations with additional information.     
13
 If we use highest educational attainment as an indicator for skill level instead of occupational status, we obtain 
the same results. 
14
 Age is measured as a cohort effect for the following birth year groups: birth year before 1951, between 1952 
and 1961, between 1962 and 1971 and after 1972. For the two variables tenure and work experience, in each 
case, we use the classification less than 10 years, between 10 and 20 years and more than 20 years of tenure or 
experience. 
13 
 
likelihood of training (Bellmann and Gerner, 2011; Gerlach and Jirjahn, 2001; Holtmann and 
Idson, 1991; Lynch, 1991). At the same time, these establishment characteristics may also 
influence the likelihood of being affected by the crisis. Bellmann et al. (2014) and Möller 
(2010) for example find that the crisis mainly affected larger establishments from the 
manufacturing sector. The establishment characteristics vector 𝑍     therefore includes the 
variables establishment size, sector and location15. The symbol 𝜀    reflects an idiosyncratic 
error term.  
We estimate a linear probability model explaining individual training participation and 
a linear regression model explaining the number of training measures. In order to gain insights 
into whether employees with specific characteristics are affected differently by the economic 
crisis, the sample is also subdivided into skilled and unskilled employees. We argue that the 
topical job is a more important determinant for training participation than the highest school-
leaving qualification and therefore we use occupational position16 as indicator for skills. We 
differentiate between employees in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs (“unskilled jobs”) and all 
other jobs (“skilled jobs”). For the separate samples, we estimate identical regression models 
for each training indicator. In addition, we test the significance of the differences between the 
coefficients of interest in the two samples using a Chi² test. The standard errors were adjusted 
using a robust, cluster-adjusted sandwich estimator. As clustering is carried out at the 
individual and the establishment level, it is possible to control for correlated observations 
within the individuals and the establishments (Moulton, 1990).  
 
Findings 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive sample characteristics of individuals employed in crisis and 
non-crisis establishments. Most participants are male (64.62%), born between 1952 and 1971 
(61.62%), and work in a skilled job (84.74%). Although 78.63% have more than 10 years of 
professional experience, only 53.48% have been working in the same establishment for more 
than 10 years. Looking at the characteristics of employees in crisis and non-crisis 
establishments, there are only few differences between the two groups. Significantly fewer 
women and employees in skilled jobs are employed in crisis establishments. However, these 
                                                          
15
 As a result of the selection process, only establishments from manufacturing and the service industry with a 
maximum of 1,999 employees were available in the data set. The establishment size is classified as less than 199, 
between 200 and 499 and between 500 and 1,999 employees. The location is captured with a dummy, indicating 
Western or Eastern Germany.   
16
 We use the Stellung im Beruf (stib) variable in the data set. 
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differences might be a consequence of the fact that the crisis establishments are more likely to 
be in the manufacturing sector. In addition, employees in non-crisis establishments have a 
slightly higher income, highest educational attainment, and occupational status.  
Employees in non-crisis establishments have a higher probability of participating in 
further training (70.29%) and a higher average number of training measures (1.37) per year 
than employees in crisis establishments (60.89%/1.11 measures). Figure 1 shows the 
development of training participation and the number of training measures over the 
observation period. In principle, a decline can be observed for both training indicators in all 
establishments. For employees in non-crisis establishments, the probability of participating in 
training declines slightly in 2008 and otherwise remains constant between 2006 and 2009. 
However, there is a decline in the year 2010. In contrast, there is a sharp and continuous 
decline in the training probability for employees in crisis establishments from 2008 onwards. 
A similar picture emerges for the development of the number of training measures. It only 
declines slightly in 2008 and 2009 and then more sharply in 2010 in non-crisis 
establishments. Employees in crisis establishments experience a strong and continuous 
decline in the number of trainings between 2008 and 2010. Thus, the training activities of 
employees in crisis-affected establishments are more negatively affected than those of 
employees in unaffected establishments.  
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Table 1: Description of differences of employees in crisis and non-crisis establishments 
Socio-demographic 
indicators  
Total 
Crisis 
establishments 
Non-crisis  
establishments 
t-values 
 % % %  
Female  35.38 23.31 41.72 14.49*** 
Birth year      
≤ 1951 14.67 13.67 15.20 1.63 
1952–61 34.41 35.56 33.80 –1.37 
1962–71 27.21 28.52 26.51 –1.67* 
≥ 1972 23.71 22.25 24.49 1.93* 
Experience      
< 10 years 21.37 19.44 22.39 2.67*** 
10–20 years 48.64 51.89 46.92 –3.68*** 
> 20 years  29.99 28.67 30.69 1.63 
Tenure     
< 10 years 46.52 46.86 46.34 –0.39 
10–20 years 39.06 41.46 37.80 –2.78*** 
> 20 years  14.42 11.68 15.86 4.41*** 
Occupational status     
Unskilled job 15.26 25.04 10.13 -15.65*** 
Skilled job 84.74 74.96 89.87 15.64*** 
Log daily wage 4.63 4.58 4.64 5.21*** 
Training participation 67.05 60.89 70.29 7.44*** 
Number of training 
measures per year 
1.28 1.11 1.37 6.48*** 
Observations 5,983 2,089 3,894  
Individuals 1,956 734 1,222  
Establishments 70 40 30  
(Log) daily wage is measured as the logarithmic weighted daily wage; *Statistically significant at the .10 level; 
**at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006–2010. 
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Non-crisis establishments (n=3,894)                     
Crisis establishments (n=2,089) 
Figure 1: Development of the training participation in % (left) and the number of training measures 
(right) in crisis and non-crisis establishments. Standard errors are included  
 
  
Non-crisis establishments/skilled (n=3,491)                                       Crisis establishments/skilled (n=1,566) 
Non-crisis establishments/unskilled (n=403)                                      Crisis establishments/unskilled (n=523) 
Figure 2: Development of training participation in % (left) and the number of training measures (right) 
separated by occupational status in crisis and non-crisis establishments. Standard errors are included  
 
Taking the occupational status of the employees into account in Figure 2, differences 
in training activities are also evident here. Employees in skilled jobs have a significantly 
higher probability of participating in training as well as a higher average number of training 
measures in both crisis and non-crisis establishments. Differences between skill groups are 
larger in non-crisis than in crisis establishments but converge over time. Considering the 
training participation of employees in skilled jobs, a stronger negative effect can be observed 
in crisis establishments, especially in 2008 and 2009. Otherwise, training changes in both 
establishment groups are comparable. A completely different picture can be seen for the 
development of training participation among employees in unskilled jobs. Whereas these 
employees in the non-crisis establishments experience a slight increase in training 
participation from 2008 to 2009 and a constant participation in 2010, the picture in crisis 
companies is exactly the opposite. Although they have a higher probability of participating in 
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training before the crisis, training participation declines since 2008 and collapses sharply in 
2009 and 2010.  
The number of training measures for employees in skilled jobs also declines in both 
crisis and non-crisis establishments, but slightly stronger in crisis establishments from 2008 
onwards. For employees in unskilled jobs, the number of training measures in crisis 
establishments is higher than in non-crisis establishments before the crisis but declines 
sharply from 2008 onwards. In contrast, the number of training measures for employees in 
unskilled jobs in non-crisis establishments remains relatively constant over time.   
 
Multivariate analyses 
The regression output in Table 2 shows the determinants of participating in training 
(model 1) and of the number of training measures (model 2). The main focus of our Diff-in-
Diff estimations is on the interaction terms of crisis dummy and years, which indicate the 
effect of the crisis on both training indicators over time. 
 
Table 2: Determinants of training participation and number of trainings 
Dependent variable Training dummy   Number of training 
 
(1) 
Diff-in-Diff 
 
(2) 
Diff-in-Diff 
Crisis * Year 2007 
–0.001 
(0.013) 
 
–0.004 
(0.029) 
Crisis * Year 2008 
–0.044 
(0.032) 
 
–0.084 
(0.092) 
Crisis * Year 2009 
–0.100*** 
(0.038) 
 
–0.215* 
(0.114) 
Crisis * Year 2010 
–0.124* 
(0.064) 
 
–0.301** 
(0.133) 
Year 2007 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
 
0.025 
(0.020) 
Year 2008 
–0.031* 
(0.018) 
 
–0.164*** 
(0.060) 
Year 2009 
–0.006 
(0.021) 
 
–0.068 
(0.068) 
Year 2010 
–0.136*** 
(0.026) 
 
–0.453*** 
(0.069) 
Crisis (treatment) 
0.035 
(0.027) 
 
0.149* 
(0.080) 
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Skilled job 
0.236*** 
(0.026) 
 
0.615*** 
(0.061) 
Tenure < 10 years 
0.068** 
(0.032) 
 
0.214** 
(0.087) 
Tenure 10–20 years 
0.038 
(0.033) 
 
0.156* 
(0.086) 
Experience < 10 years 
–0.093** 
(0.043) 
 
–0.166 
(0.128) 
Experience 10–20 years 
–0.014 
(0.028) 
 
–0.055 
(0.086) 
Birth year 1952–1961 
0.076*** 
(0.028) 
 
0.201** 
(0.081) 
Birth year 1962–1971 
0.088*** 
(0.030) 
 
0.296*** 
(0.092) 
Birth year > 1972 
0.162*** 
(0.042) 
 
0.428*** 
(0.126) 
Female 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
 
0.133** 
(0.065) 
Employees_199 
–0.158*** 
(0.026) 
 
–0.535*** 
(0.071) 
Employees_499 
–0.052** 
(0.023) 
 
–0.066 
(0.072) 
Western Germany 
0.026 
(0.025) 
 
0.094 
(0.076) 
Service sector 
0.144*** 
(0.022) 
 
0.487*** 
(0.063) 
R²  0.093  0.096 
Observations 5,983  5,983 
Dependent variables: training participation (model 1), number of training (model 2); reference category for age: 
birth year ≤ 1951; reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20 years; reference category for experience: experience 
≥ 20 years; reference category for occupation status: unskilled job; reference category for establishment size: ≥ 
500 employees. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. Source: WeLL-
ADIAB 2006–2010. 
 
The results for model 1 show no significant Diff-in-Diff effect for the pre-crisis period 
in 2007. Thus, the identification assumption is fulfilled that, without a crisis, the training 
behaviour for employees in crisis and non-crisis establishments was the same. As a 
consequence, the Diff-in-Diff approach identifies the causal recession effect
17
. However, there 
is a reduction in training participation by 10.0 PP in 2009 and 12.4 PP in 2010 for individuals 
employed in crisis establishments. Therefore, we find support for the first hypothesis that the 
crisis of the years 2008 and 2009 reduced training efforts. Significant year dummies in 2008 
                                                          
17
 An insignificant Diff-in-Diff coefficient before the treatment also can be called a placebo test. This method 
serves as an alternative for more data-intensive approaches such as matching (Bellmann et al., 2014). 
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and 2010 indicate a decline in training participation for employees in all establishments 
irrespectively of whether they were directly hit by the crisis or not. The insignificant crisis 
dummy indicates that there are no differences in training participation of employees in the 
treatment group and the control group beyond the year effects measured by the interaction 
terms. Furthermore, especially young and employees in skilled jobs and with higher 
professional experience have a higher training participation. In addition, employees from 
larger companies and from the service sector tend to participate more in training.  
Results for model 2 suggest similar effects of the crisis on the number of training 
measures. Again, there is a negative effect for employees in all establishments for the years 
2008 and 2010. Beyond this effect, significantly negative Diff-in-Diff effects for the years 
2009 (–0.215) and 2010 (–0.301) indicate that the decline in the number of training measures 
is greater for employees in crisis establishments than in non-crisis establishments. This 
finding supports the assumption of the second hypothesis. Effects of further individual and 
establishment characteristics are similar to the training dummy.  
Our results confirm the negative crisis effect on training reported in Popov (2014) and 
Bellmann et al. (2014). These results however have been derived on the basis of the answers 
of individual training participants instead of the managers who also indicated whether their 
firms have been hit by the crisis. In addition to the previous results, we find a negative 
significant direct crisis effect for the year 2010. The delayed effect of the crisis in 2010 could 
be a result of the fact that training measures are often planned on a longer–term basis. Many 
measures may already have been booked at the beginning of the crisis and could not be 
cancelled or expanded at short notice after the crisis.  
In the next step, we analyse whether the impact of the crisis on training activities 
differs by occupational status. For this purpose, we look at the effects on training participation 
(Table 3) and on the number of training measures (Table 4) separately for employees in 
unskilled and skilled jobs.  
  
20 
 
 
Table 3: Determinants of the training participation by occupational status  
Dependent variable Training dummy Training dummy Differences 
 
Employees in unskilled 
jobs (1) 
Diff-in-Diff 
Employees in skilled 
jobs (2) 
Diff-in-Diff 
 
 
(Chi² test) 
Crisis * Year 2007 
0.051 
(0.038) 
–0.014 
(0.013) 
2.68 
(0.102) 
Crisis * Year 2008 
–0.054 
(0.082) 
–0.048 
(0.036) 
0.00 
(0.946) 
Crisis * Year 2009 
–0.215** 
(0.100) 
–0.081* 
(0.042) 
1.56 
(0.212) 
Crisis * Year 2010 
–0.427*** 
(0.123) 
–0.024 
(0.086) 
7.40*** 
(0.007) 
Year 2007 
0.002 
(0.025) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.77 
(0.380) 
Year 2008 
–0.017 
(0.059) 
–0.030 
(0.019) 
0.05 
(0.828) 
Year 2009 
0.062 
(0.072) 
–0.012 
(0.022) 
0.96 
(0.327) 
Year 2010 
0.060 
(0.081) 
–0.156*** 
(0.027) 
6.63*** 
(0.009) 
Crisis (treatment) 
0.213*** 
(0.070) 
–0.019 
(0.030) 
9.54*** 
(0.002) 
Tenure < 10 years 
–0.051 
(0.090) 
0.086** 
(0.034) 
 
Tenure 10–20 years 
–0.167** 
(0.081) 
0.075** 
(0.036) 
 
Experience < 10 years 
–0.045 
(0.103) 
–0.104** 
(0.046) 
 
Experience 10–20 years 
–0.089 
(0.065) 
–0.017 
(0.031) 
 
Birth year 1952–1961 
0.006 
(0.093) 
0.084*** 
(0.030) 
 
Birth year 1962–1971 
0.025 
(0.096) 
0.098*** 
(0.032) 
 
Birth year > 1972 
0.025 
(0.112) 
0.164*** 
(0.044) 
 
Female 
–0.189*** 
(0.057) 
–0.012 
(0.021) 
 
Employees_199 
–0.165** 
(0.064) 
–0.137*** 
(0.029) 
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Employees_499 
–0.038 
(0.059) 
–0.044* 
(0.026) 
 
Western Germany 
0.049 
(0.058) 
0.033 
(0.027) 
 
Service sector 
0.117** 
(0.054) 
0.118*** 
(0.025) 
 
R²  0.122 0.057  
Observations 926 5,057  
Dependent variable: training participation; separate analysis for skill groups; reference category for age: birth 
year ≤ 1951; reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20 years; reference category for experience: experience ≥ 20 
years; reference category for establishment size: ≥ 500 employees. Standard errors based on a robust cluster-
adjusted sandwich estimator in parentheses; *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at 
the .01 level. Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006–2010. 
 
Table 3 shows that the crisis reduces the probability to participate in training for 
employees in unskilled jobs additionally by 21.5 PP in 2009 and by 42.7 PP in 2010. In 
contrast, there is only a slightly negative effect on training participation for employees in 
skilled jobs of 8.1 PP in the year 2009 and hardly any negative Diff-in-Diff effect in 2010 (–
2.4 PP, not significant). Furthermore, the Chi² test indicates that the coefficients of both 
groups are significantly different in the year 2010. Thus, the findings suggest a stronger 
negative direct effect of the crisis on training participation for employees in unskilled jobs 
than for employees in skilled jobs. Therefore, the third hypothesis can be confirmed.  
Table 4 shows the impact of the crisis on the number of training measures for 
employees in unskilled and skilled jobs. As with training participation, the crisis had a 
significant additional negative effect on the number of trainings for employees in unskilled 
jobs in 2008 (–0.279), 2009 (–0.452), and especially in 2010 (–0.936). In contrast, there is a 
significantly negative Diff-in-Diff effect for employees in unskilled jobs only in 2009 (–
0.216). Thus, the Chi² test again suggests significantly different Diff-in-Diff coefficients for 
the year 2010 for employees in skilled and unskilled jobs. Consequently, the fourth hypothesis 
can be confirmed. The other individual- and establishment-level determinants for both 
training indicators are robust to the change in the dependent variable.  
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Table 4: Determinants of the number of trainings by occupational status  
Dependent variable Number of trainings Number of trainings Differences 
 
Employees in unskilled 
Jobs (1) 
Diff-in-Diff 
Employees in skilled 
jobs (2) 
Diff-in-Diff 
 
 
(Chi² test) 
Crisis * Year 2007 
0.071 
(0.063) 
–0.028 
(0.032) 
2.03 
(0.155) 
Crisis * Year 2008 
–0.279* 
(0.158) 
–0.091 
(0.104) 
1.00 
(0.316) 
Crisis * Year 2009 
–0.452** 
(0.203) 
–0.216* 
(0.128) 
0.99 
(0.320) 
Crisis * Year 2010 
–0.936*** 
(0.228) 
–0.249 
(0.178) 
5.76** 
(0.016) 
Year 2007 
0.005 
(0.037) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
0.89 
(0.346) 
Year 2008 
–0.099 
(0.102) 
–0.186* 
(0.106) 
5.64** 
(0.018) 
Year 2009 
0.194 
(0.118) 
–0.091 
(0.074) 
4.24** 
(0.039) 
Year 2010 
0.129 
(0.128) 
–0.509* 
(0.276) 
18.80*** 
(0.000) 
Crisis (treatment) 
0.511*** 
(0.132) 
–0.065 
(0.095) 
8.57*** 
(0.003) 
Tenure < 10 years 
–0.063 
(0.166) 
0.245** 
(0.098) 
 
Tenure 10–20 years 
–0.144** 
(0.155) 
0.210** 
(0.098) 
 
Experience < 10 years 
–0.107 
(0.219) 
–0.131** 
(0.148) 
 
Experience 10–20 years 
0.084 
(0.129) 
–0.035 
(0.103) 
 
Birth year 1952–1961 
0.183 
(0.142) 
0.202** 
(0.089) 
 
Birth year 1962–1971 
0.158 
(0.138) 
0.300*** 
(0.103) 
 
Birth year > 1972 
0.383** 
(0.193) 
0.388*** 
(0.143) 
 
Female 
–0.255** 
(0.100) 
–0.203*** 
(0.074) 
 
Employees_199 
–0.408*** 
(0.147) 
–0.531*** 
(0.082) 
 
Employees_499 
–0.018 
(0.142) 
–0.063 
(0.085) 
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Western Germany 
0.021 
(0.128) 
0.132 
(0.091) 
 
Service sector 
0.363*** 
(0.134) 
0.450*** 
(0.076) 
 
R²  0.114 0.068  
Observations 926 5,057  
Dependent variable: number of training measures; separate analysis for skill groups; reference category for age: 
birth year ≤ 1951; reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20 years; reference category for experience: experience 
≥ 20 years; reference category for establishment size: ≥ 500 employees. Standard errors based on a robust 
cluster-adjusted sandwich estimator in parentheses; *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; 
*** at the .01 level. Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006–2010. 
 
Robustness checks 
In order to control whether we find the negative effect of the crisis on employees in 
unskilled jobs also when we use the full sample with additional interaction terms for 
employees in skilled and unskilled jobs, a regression equation with triple interaction terms is 
calculated as a robustness check. More specifically, all four Diff-in-Diff interaction terms 
(𝐶  ∗ 𝑇′ ) are additionally interacted with a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if 
individuals are in an unskilled job. Thus, the triple interaction terms (Difference-in-
Difference-in-Differences) in Table A1 in the Appendix imply the additional effects of the 
crisis for employees in unskilled jobs in comparison to employees in skilled jobs between 
2007 and 2010. According to our previous results, we find stronger negative effects of the 
crisis for employees in unskilled jobs. The crisis reduces the participation of training for 
employees in unskilled jobs additionally by 14.2 PP in 2009 (not significant) and by 42.9 PP 
in 2010. Additional negative effects of the crisis for employees in unskilled jobs are also 
evident in the number of training measures. However, again the triple Diff-in-Diff effect is 
only significant in 2010 (–0.673).  
In the analyses carried out so far, employees in short-time work have been excluded. 
As training in the crisis was often offered in conjunction with short-time work (Brenke et al., 
2013), establishments’ training decisions were probably based on other than the usual cost–
benefit considerations. In order to ensure that training investments in the crisis were not 
driven by short-time working arrangements, our last robustness check also includes 
employees who attended short-time work. The results in Table A2 in the Appendix confirm 
the previous findings.   
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Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to determine the causal effect of an economic crisis on 
the training activities of different employee groups. From a theoretical point of view, the 
effect is unclear because there are arguments for both directions. The few existing empirical 
studies on the Great Recession indicate a counter-cyclical development of training (Bellmann 
et al., 2014; Felstead et al., 2012; Mason and Bishop, 2015; Popov, 2014). However, there is 
no empirical evidence regarding the individual training behaviour of employee groups. Based 
on a unique German linked employer–employee panel data set, this paper seeks to fill this 
gap. Using Diff-in-Diff analyses, we avoid endogeneity problems caused by unobservable 
third factors that otherwise influence both the training activities of the establishment and its 
probability of being hit by the recession (Hochfellner et al., 2015; Popov, 2014). Furthermore, 
by separating the source of training data from the source of crisis information, we avoid 
common method bias. Moreover, the so-called Great Recession in 2008 and 2009 can be seen 
as an unforeseen, exogenous and time-limited shock. This quasi-experimental setting 
therefore reveals the causal impact of the crisis on training participation and the number of 
training measures. In addition, we show that the recession hit training activities of employees 
in skilled and unskilled jobs differently.  
We observe a negative causal effect of the crisis on individual training activities in 
2009 and 2010. This reduction in training efforts is especially strong for employees in 
unskilled jobs. Although there is only a slight negative effect of the crisis on employees in 
skilled jobs in 2009, we observe a much greater negative impact for employees in unskilled 
jobs between 2008 and 2010. The stronger reduction in training opportunities for employees 
in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs who usually earn less than the employees in the skilled jobs 
might be one of the reasons for the frequently observed increase in income inequality after 
recessions (Forster et al., 2011; Grabka, 2015; OECD, 2015). The negative trend in training in 
the year 2010, which is evident in all groups except for unskilled employees in establishments 
unaffected by the crisis, shows that the crisis had a lagged effect on training efforts. Training 
measures are usually booked well in advance and cannot be cancelled at short notice. A 
lagged recovery of training investments therefore also might be a reason for a sluggish 
recovery of the economy (Bloom, 2014). 
There are some limitations of this paper. First, we only can use a sub-sample of firms 
in our data set with information on the crisis status, compare Dietz and Zwick (2016). Second, 
important training information in the data set is not available from all surveys. Therefore, we 
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cannot include further training characteristics beyond those included. Third, the data set is 
limited to certain economic sectors and federal states. Therefore, the representativeness of the 
results has to be examined critically in future research.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A1: Determinants of the training participation and the number of training, triple-Diff-in-Diff-
estimation 
Dependent variable Training dummy  Number of training 
 
(1) 
Diff-in-Diff 
 (2) 
Diff-in-Diff 
Crisis * Year 2007 * Unskilled job  0.059 
(0.041) 
 0.114 
(0.071) 
Crisis * Year 2008 * Unskilled job –0.005 
(0.089) 
 –0.158 
(0.198) 
Crisis * Year 2009 * Unskilled job –0.142 
(0.108) 
 –0.225 
(0.246) 
Crisis * Year 2010 * Unskilled job –0.429*** 
(0.146) 
 –0.673*** 
(0.264) 
Crisis * Year 2007 –0.014 
(0.013) 
 –0.028 
(0.032) 
Crisis * Year 2008 –0.048 
(0.036) 
 –0.091 
(0.105) 
Crisis * Year 2009 –0.081* 
(0.042) 
 –0.215* 
(0.128) 
Crisis * Year 2010 –0.027 
(0.085) 
 –0.262 
(0.175) 
Crisis * Unskilled job 0.281*** 
(0.072) 
 0.588*** 
(0.152) 
Year 2007 * Unskilled job –0.022 
(0.026) 
 –0.056 
(0.043) 
Year 2008 * Unskilled job 0.007 
(0.062) 
 0.250** 
(0.118) 
Year 2009 * Unskilled job 0.068 
(0.075) 
 0.271* 
(0.139) 
Year 2010 * Unskilled job 0.199** 
(0.087) 
 0.609*** 
(0.151) 
Year 2007 0.020** 
(0.008) 
 0.033 
(0.022) 
Year 2008 –0.032 
(0.019) 
 –0.191*** 
(0.066) 
Year 2009 –0.013 
(0.022) 
 –0.096 
(0.074) 
Year 2010 –0.156*** 
(0.027) 
 –0.516*** 
(0.075) 
Employee in unskilled job –0.391*** 
(0.053) 
 –1.015*** 
(0.097) 
Crisis (treatment) –0.020 
(0.028) 
 0.037 
(0.090) 
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Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes 
Establishment characteristics  Yes  Yes 
R²  0.103  0.100 
Observations 5,983  5,983 
Dependent variables: training participation, number of training measures; separate analysis for skill groups; 
reference category for age: birth year ≤ 1951; reference category for tenure: tenure ≥ 20 years; reference 
category for experience: experience ≥ 20 years; reference category for establishment size: ≥ 500 employees. 
Standard errors based on a robust cluster-adjusted sandwich estimator in parentheses; *Statistically significant at 
the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006–2010. 
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Table A2: Determinants of the training participation and number of training (sample with short-time 
workers) 
Dependent variable: 
Training 
participation 
Diff-in-Diff 
 
Number of training 
Diff-in-Diff 
Crisis * Year 2007 
0.005 
(0.015) 
 
0.004 
(0.043) 
Crisis * Year 2008 
–0.024 
(0.032) 
 
–0.077 
(0.089) 
Crisis * Year 2009 
–0.075** 
(0.036) 
 
–0.241*** 
(0.089) 
Crisis * Year 2010 
–0.171*** 
(0.041) 
 
–0.343*** 
(0.097) 
Crisis (treatment) Yes  Yes 
Individual characteristics  Yes  Yes 
Establishment characteristics  Yes  Yes 
R²  0.101  0.113 
Observations 7,763  7,763 
Dependent variables: training participation and number of training measures; separate analysis for experience 
groups; Further individual characteristics: occupation status, tenure, age, gender; establishment characteristics: 
size, location, sector. Standard errors based on a robust cluster-adjusted sandwich estimator in parentheses; 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level. Source: WeLL-ADIAB 2006–
2010. 
